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Abstract  
European societies have experienced a growing concern about the consequences that the reunification of 
migrants’ families in their soil may have for the management of their borders and the success of the integration 
process. Many policy makers assume that most migrants intend to bring their relatives to Europe as soon as 
possible, and argue that reunified migrants might not be that easy to integrate into their host societies. Our results 
concerning the process of reunification of Senegalese couples in France, Italy or Spain strongly challenge this 
view. Using MAFE (Migration between Africa and Europe) data with a life history approach, we show that (1) 
separation is often a long lasting situation among Senegalese couples; (2) separated couples do not only reunify 
in Europe but also quite commonly in Senegal; (3) the couples who reunify in Europe tend to be the most 




Family reunification has become a major policy concern all over Europe in the last decades, as it is illustrated by 
the growing legal restrictions implemented since the late seventies (OECD 2001; Kraler 2010). This concern is 
double sided. First, there was and there still is a fear related to quantity: family reunification is viewed by most 
policy makers as a powerful immigration multiplier, every migrant being systematically seen as a reunifier who 
intends to bring in Europe his/her whole family. In more recent years, the debate about family reunification 
policies has shifted from the size of the flows to their composition. The ability of reunified immigrants to 
successfully integrate into their host societies both economically and culturally is now at the forefront of the 
debate (Grillo 2008). First of all, migrants admitted on the basis of family reunification are assumed to be mostly 
dependents, i.e. out of the labor market and, thus, will increase the dependency ratio among the immigrant 
population. Secondly, it has become a commonplace to blame family reunification as responsible of increasing 
closure trends within immigrant communities and their failed integration into the host societies. Yet, most of 
these common wisdoms and policy measures inspired and justified by them are not grounded in solid empirical 
evidence. The fact that family reunification has become the first legal mode of entry into Europe simply reflects 
the fact that most European countries stopped labor migration in the 1970s. It does not imply that all migrants 
are reunifiers. As a matter of fact, there is a dearth of adequate data to analyze both the potential for family 
reunification and the integration outcomes of immigrants admitted on family and non-family grounds (Kofman 
2004; González-Ferrer, Gómez and Obúcina, 2012).  
Using a unique dataset that contains biographical information, that is transnational (i.e. based on surveys carried 
out both in Europe and in Africa) and that includes both documented and undocumented migrants
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, this paper 
                                                          
1 The Senegalese part of the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project is coordinated by INED (C. 
Beauchemin), in association with the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho). The project also involves the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizan), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (A. González-
Ferrer), and the Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione (E. Castagnone). The survey 
was conducted with the financial support of INED, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, the Région Ile de 
France and the FSP programme 'International Migrations, territorial reorganizations and development of the 
countries of the South'. The MAFE-Senegal project is now being enlarged to Ghanaian and Congolese 
migrations, thanks to a funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant 
agreement 217206. For more information (including the questionnaires), see: http://www.mafeproject. 
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intends to bring a new perspective on family reunification by conceptualizing family reunification from a double 
viewpoint (considering reunification not only in Europe, but also in Africa) and as a double selection act (by the 
states, but also by the migrants themselves). In this perspective, Senegalese migration is taken as an empirical 
case study to bring new quantitative evidence, in a domain where the socio-anthropological is so far dominant. 
Senegalese migration appears as a critical and relevant case since Senegalese families, and Sub-Saharan African 
families in general, have been a clear target of restrictive family reunification policies due to their larger size, 
their multigenerational structure and their relatively frequent practice of polygamy
2
.  
Building on previous theoretical and ethnographic studies, we argue that not all migrants (and their relatives) 
wish to reunify as soon as possible; that reunification in Europe is not their only option, some of them preferring 
to re-join their relatives back at the home country; and that reunification in Europe is -in fact- the choice of the 
most integrated/integrable ones. Accordingly, we test two hypotheses: (1) Couple separation is likely to work as 
a long lasting arrangement for many African migrants, especially if partners can visit each other frequently. (2) 
Reunification in Europe is more likely when men are economically and culturally integrated and women have 
the potential to adapt to the receiving context (more education, higher occupational skills, childless, etc.). The 
article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review that helps to understand the logics of family 
reunification by bringing together three separate strands of research (economic theories on migration decision-
making, transnational and socio-anthropological approaches to the study of migration and African family 
dynamics, and previous quantitative research in this field). Next, we present in detail the MAFE survey, its 
advantages for this kind of study and the methods used in our analyses. Finally, we summarize and discuss the 
obtained results in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
                                                          
2 Families that do not fit to the dominant nuclear Western model are especially stigmatized, as illustrated by the 
statements of the French Minister of Employment who, during the Paris suburbs riots in 2005, fingered 
polygamy as the main reason for the discrimination faced by ethnic minorities in the French job market : ‘overly 
large polygamous families sometimes led to anti-social behavior among youths who lacked a father figure, 
making employers wary of hiring ethnic minorities’ (Financial Times, 15th November 2005).  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Family Reunification as a double selection process 
States undoubtedly play a major role in the selection of both migrants who can reunify (the “reunifiers”) and 
those who join their relative(s) at destination (the “reunified” ones). However, as Borjas pointed out, states can 
only select from the available self-selected pool of applicants: those who already want to migrate (reunify) 
abroad (1990). Individuals, regardless of whether they are migrants or their “left behind” relatives, are also 
selection actors. Besides, they may decide to ignore governmental restrictions and reunify de facto, without 
following the legally established procedure to do so
3
. On the other hand, whatever the door of entry they chose, 
they also decide the timing and the place to reunify.  
In sum, family reunification is thus a double selection act (Bledsoe and Sow 2008) in which at least two types of 
selection processes overlap: on the one hand, the one derived from the costs and constraints that immigration 
policies impose on individuals willing to migrate and, on the other, the one related to the own families’ decision-
making process with regard to reunification. Unfortunately, we still know very little about these two processes 
and how they interact with each other. Although some studies have dealt with family migration decisions, they 
are mostly restricted to the experience of internal migrants and focused on family separation (Sandell 1977; 
Mincer 1978; Courgeau 1990; Mulder and Wagner 1993; Stark 1988) rather than on the process leading to 
family reunification after a period of physical separation due to international migration. As Grasmuck and Pessar 
(1991) brilliantly illustrated in their analysis of Dominican international migration, negotiation concerning who 
migrates first and who follows -if someone does- among the household’s members is far from being 
straightforward. The living arrangements that families involved in international migration adopt do not 
necessarily reflect each individual’s preferences but also their bargaining position within the household or 
family, and hence the normative context that structures their roles, at least loosely, in generational and gendered 
ways (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992, 1994, 1999). 
                                                          
3 “De facto” reunification refers not only to reunification carried out by irregular migrants but also by migrants 
that enter the country where their relatives reside legally but utilizing a legal door of entry different from family 
reunification, like employment-based migration or seasonal work, for instance. 
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2.2. Family reunification in and out of economic theories of migration 
There is actually no consistent theoretical model accounting for family-linked migration. Family reunification 
has not been explicitly addressed by either Neoclassical Economics (NE) or New Economics of Labor Migration 
(NELM). It is however possible to derive some predictions about reunification behaviors from these two 
theoretical strands. The NE approach conceived migrants as ‘income maximizers’ who will stay abroad as long 
as the expected income differentials between their country of origin and their country of destination persisted 
(Todaro 1976). Accordingly, they are expected to endure relatively long separations from their relatives left 
behind, until proper arrangements can be made for family reunification in the country of immigration (i.e. 
obtaining a stable job position, being able to pay a bigger apartment by their own, etc., which takes some time). 
Due to its strongly individualist approach, the reasoning provided by the NE model neglects the possibility that 
reunifying with the partner at destination may contribute to the couple’s income maximization, if this second 
partner is willing to work as well. Similarly, the possibility that reunification takes place back in the origin 
country is not considered either, since the economic reasons that underlie the migration decision (international 
wage differentials) are difficult to remove and, consequently, return would not be a rational decision. 
In contrast to this, the NELM clearly familized the international migration decision by placing individuals in the 
larger context of their households and considering the role that different household’s members played in 
providing for the family. In addition, Stark and his colleagues (1991) conceived international migration as a 
household strategy oriented to minimize the economic risk deriving from a variety of market failures, instead of 
an individual strategy to maximize income. By allocating different household’s members in different countries 
where employment conditions are weakly or not correlated, families can diversify the sources of risk and better 
provide for their economic well-being. Thus, the international migrant that NELM envisages is a ‘target-earner’ 
migrant that will return to origin as soon as the macro-economic context and his/her own economic situation 
allow to successfully cope with the economic risks the household has to face. Accordingly, partners’ 
reunification at destination makes little sense in the context of NELM, unless the sponsored partner is also 
willing to work there. In such a case, reunification is accomplished in order to reduce the number and duration of 
trips and to increase the probability to return (instead of settling permanently), by enhancing the household’s 
ability to meet a given earnings/savings target (Constant and Massey 2002).  
Partner’s reunification at destination can thus be partially explained by both theoretical frameworks, although 
they would interpret reunification as an indication of opposing residential intentions: the couple’s reunification 
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would suggest a clear movement towards permanent settlement at destination for NE’s income-maximizing 
migrants, whereas it would indicate an attempt to accelerate return to the home country for NELM’s target-
earners. Moreover, conditional on his/her willingness to work at destination and for the same reasons, the 
partner’s reunification is expected to be quicker among target-earner migrants than income-maximizing ones. 
2.3. Empirical evidence on migrants’ couple formation, separation and reunion 
NE and NELM theories both suffer from two main limitations that new approaches on transnationalism have 
repeatedly emphasized (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). First, both remain largely constrained by some sort of 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Winner and Glick Schiller 2003) and restrict their analyses to either the country of 
destination or the sending one, and consequently tend to neglect the possibility of repeated movements back and 
forth by different family members as a strategy to sustain cross-border livelihoods (Sorensen and Olwig 2002). 
In fact, recent socio-anthropological research in the area of transnational families provided the best illustrations 
and analyses that allow to understand that living apart-together across countries is a rational and even functional 
strategy for migrant families
4
. In some particular cases like the Senegalese separation and transnational 
arrangements often appears as a choice rather than just a situation that migrants accept due to their vulnerable 
economic and legal position in Europe but anxiously waiting for the opportunity of reunification in Europe 
(Bledsoe and Sow 2008; Bledsoe 2008; Riccio 2001; Rodríguez-García 2006).  
Secondly, studies inspired by transnationalism have been particularly successful in highlighting how mainstream 
economic explanations of migration decisions remained largely gender and culture-blind approaches. 
Sociologists and demographers, however, have also increasingly emphasized the gendered nature of migration 
and family dynamics among migrants in quantitative studies. A great example of this can be found in the 
growing number of analyses of marriage migration in different European countries that followed the challenging 
idea of Lievens (1999) that Moroccan and Turkish ‘women may marry an imported partner in order to satisfy 
modern goals’ (p. 717). While the decision of male migrants to choose a female partner who still lives in their 
country of origin could be easily due to the strong sex imbalance that affects first generation of some ethnic 
                                                          
4 Even long-lasting separations and the possibility of recurrent circulation or repeated migration as a way of 
diversifying risk is compatible with the theoretical model developed by NELM, although Stark and his 
colleagues never explicitly developed it; in addition, they also seemed to view reunification in destination as the 
sign of permanent settlement that would explain, among others, the decay of remittances (Stark and Lucas 1985). 
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groups in Europe, plus a wish for ‘unspoiled’ traditional wives, the same reasoning does not apply so easily 
either to female migrants or second generation youths. In fact, the empirical evidence available so far tends to 
support the hypothesis that marriage migration mostly entails a traditional option among immigrant men, as 
suggested by the negative and significant relationship between the men’s educational level and his probability to 
import a partner, instead of marrying a native or a co-national immigrant already at destination (Lievens 1999; 
Celikaksoy et al. 2003; González-Ferrer 2006). In contrast, most studies have found positive, although generally 
no significant relationship, between the educational level of immigrant women and their propensity to import a 
partner from their country of origin (Hooghiemstra 2001; Celikaksoy et al. 2003; González-Ferrer 2006: Kalter 
and Schroedter 2010).  
The limited value of education to explain why some immigrant women choose transnational partners, instead of 
co-national immigrants already at destination, have led some authors to analyze the potential influence of the 
social group of reference in some ethnic groups, and also the potential benefits that may derive for the woman 
from this marital strategy in terms of bargaining power within the couple -because she is the one who already 
knows the country where the couple will settle-, as the two main mechanisms that may explain importation of 
partners by female immigrants in Europe (Kalmijn 1998; González-Ferrer 2006).  
In the case of family reunification of partner whose couple pre-existed migration, some studies have also found a 
different effect of education by gender in explaining the likelihood and length of spouses’ separation due to 
international migration. Gupta (2003) found that more educated Mexican women are also more likely to migrate 
with their husbands to the US than being left behind. In addition, for couples who have experienced at least one 
spell of separation, separation tends to be shorter the more educated the husband is
5
. She conjectured that 
education improves women’s status overall and results in more egalitarian partners’ relationship, which in turn 
might make wives more likely to insist in migrating with their husbands or, alternatively, to succeed in 
persuading them of not migrating at all. González-Ferrer (2007) also found that more educated women are likely 
to join their husbands in Germany more quickly than less educated ones, whereas having a husband with more 
                                                          
5 However, she framed the study within the context of circular or repeated migration, focused on visits to the 
family in the country of origin that interrupt spouses’ separation and, therefore, excluded from the analysis 
couples who were separated for all twelve months in the year. 
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years of education substantially increase the odds of joint couple migration but does not significantly affect the 
pace of the spouses’ reunification at destination. 
2.4. Family and migration dynamics in Senegal 
In Senegal, like in almost all sub-Saharan societies, the basic social unit is some form of extended family. 
According to the latest Census of 2002, the average size of Senegalese households was 9.1 persons, which is not 
surprising if one takes into account, among other things, that polygamy is permitted and relatively extended (25 
percent of all marriages are polygamous, according to the Senegalese Census of 2002) (Vázquez Silva 2010). In 
addition, after marriage, the wife moves to the house of her husband's family in the majority of cases, especially 
in rural areas, where she will take care of the house chores and caring tasks in collaboration with other women of 
the family –maybe other co-spouses if the husband is polygamous, or her new sisters’ in law (Poiret 1996). 
Marrying and moving to the husband’s parental home does not necessarily imply a great deal of intimacy 
between the spouses, at least not in the Western way. According to Findley, in much of sub-Saharan Africa, men 
and women take their meals separately, rarely socialize together, and have marriages where the level of conjugal 
interaction is quite low  (Findley 1997: 121). Indeed, in the Senegalese traditional family model, being in a 
couple does not necessarily imply to live together in the same place. In Africa there is quite a high proportion of 
spouses living in distant places for relatively long periods (from 3 to 7 years), frequently as a result of intense 
internal migration aimed at diversify sources of income and risk across several places. Findley estimated 
between 43 and 68 the percentage of couples being in this situation at some point during their lives in Senegal 
(Findley, 1997: 125). In the urban context and where polygamy is frequent, living in different dwellings even 
when both spouses reside in the same locality is not rare. 
In any case, and regardless of migration, in the most extended traditional family system, once the newly-wed 
wife moves in ‘her’ new household, she becomes under the authority not only of her husband and other old men 
in his family but also under the authority of the older women, especially her mother in law, for whom she 
becomes a care-giver (see more details in Vazquez-Silva 2010). This role of daughters-in-law towards their 
mothers-in-law, as well as the risk that remittances sent by young male migrants in Europe to their parental 
household in Senegal will decline if their wife (and children) joins them abroad, renders absolutely rational for 
the elders in the family to oppose to any form of “family reunification” in Europe. In addition, the European 
dominant way of living, as well as the increasingly restrictive immigration policies that have stigmatized large 
African polygamous families and their living arrangements have also probably reinforced this view of 
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reunification in Europe as a sub-optimal choice. Thus, transnational couples as a relatively stable living 
arrangement for Senegalese individuals involved in international migration to Europe may appear as a 
completely rational and whished outcome for many of the male migrants currently ‘living alone’ in Italy, France 
or Spain.  
In Senegal, like in most countries, the dominant type of family organization that we have just described, as well 
as the family values associated to it, are subjected to continuous challenges by groups and individuals that either 
belong to minority ethnic or religious groups different from the largest one, or possess larger resources that allow 
them to (at least partially) deviate from the social norm. In our case, as we said, the previous description 
corresponds to the most traditional family model among the Wolof, the largest ethnic group in the region of 
Dakar and the most numerous one among Senegalese migrants in Europe. Yet, the Serer and the Diola groups, 
for instance, are known to have traditionally followed a lineage system with some matrilineal elements (Dupire 
1977), which would probably imply a stronger women’s bargaining position within their couple and families at 
large, and will then alter some of the behaviors described above. For the same reason, men with higher economic 
stability and women with higher levels of education are clear candidates to deviate from the dominant behavior 
regarding family reunification, because resources in general will provide individuals with additional 
opportunities to successfully circumvent social pressures coming from their pairs and, in addition, will make 
them more “integrable” candidates from the point of view of Western countries6. 
3. Data and Methods 
The objective of this article is to study the timing and the determinants of reunification among Senegalese 
couples that at some point lived geographically separated (in different countries) due to the migration of one of 
the partners to Europe. We call these couples “transnational couples”: they are “living apart together” across 
borders because they are physically “separated” but may maintain alive their emotional or legal ties (marriage), 
                                                          
6 Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. (2012) have already shown about parents-children reunification that parents who end 
separations by returning to Senegal belong to families that clearly depart from the Western nuclear model, 
whereas Senegalese families in which parents decided to bring their children to Europe are closer to Western 
family arrangements. 
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economic exchanges, frequent visits, family obligations, common children, etc.
7
 “Reunification” occurs when 
partners start living in the same country (not necessarily in the same dwelling) after a period of transnational 
partnership. Thus, reunification does not restrict to the legal procedure but we rather analyse “de facto” 
reunification, which includes all sorts of reunification: in Senegal or in Europe, following the legal procedure 
specifically established to that goal or any other available channel, including irregular migration. 
A proper analysis of this kind requires information on individuals who are both at origin (in Senegal) and 
destination (in Europe). In addition, multi-level time-varying information is also needed in order to characterize 
the couples –and their members– not only at the time of the survey but also at the time of reunification (or just 
before); and the same information is required for those couples who have not reunified yet. There is thus a need 
for a transnational sample that includes partners that participated in transnational couples at some point during 
their lives, some of which having reunified (either in Europe or in Senegal), while others are still separated at the 
time of the survey.  
3.1. The MAFE-Senegal Survey 
Few datasets present the features that are needed to study the determinants of family reunification. The MAFE-
Senegal survey is, for two reasons, one of the rare quantitative sources that allow such analyses. First, it consists 
in a transnational dataset resulting from the collection of individual data both in European countries and in 
Senegal utilizing identical questionnaires: 603 Senegalese migrants were surveyed in Europe (about 200 in each 
of the following countries: France, Italy and Spain
8
) and 1,067 persons were interviewed in the region of Dakar 
(including 197 returnees and 101 migrant’s partners at the time of the survey, i.e. 2008)
9
. Second, the data are 
                                                          
7
 At least one of the partners was born Senegalese in Senegal, the other one may have or not the same 
citizenship. 
8 For the sake of simplicity in writing and reading, we will refer in the rest of the text to “Europe” instead of 
mentioning these three different destination countries.  
9
 A perfect survey on Senegalese migration would have covered the whole Senegal and all countries in the world 
where Senegalese migrants are present. For practical reasons, it was obviously impossible. However the places 
covered by the MAFE Senegal survey offer a good coverage of Senegalese people. On one hand, in Europe, 
France, Spain and Italy accounted for 45 percent of the international Senegalese migrants declared in the 2002 
Senegal Census. On the other hand, the region of Dakar is home to about a quarter of the national population in 
the 2002 Senegal Census and is the region of origin of 31% of the international migrants declared in 2001-2002 
by Senegalese households in the ESAM-II survey. More information on the design of the MAFE project in 
Beauchemin (2011).  
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time-varying by nature since they result from individual life-histories collected in biographical questionnaires. 
The questionnaire was designed to collect retrospectively biographical information on a yearly basis from birth 
until the time of survey (2008), for each sampled individual, whatever his/her country of residence at the time of 
the survey. The data collected include a large range of information on migration and occupation histories of the 
interviewed persons, as well as on their family history (children, partnerships). Interestingly, the questionnaire 
includes a whole module on the international migrations of the interviewee relatives (including his/her current 
and past partners), international migration being defined as a stay of at least 12 months outside Senegal. This 12-
month threshold also applies to couple’s separation and reunification: a separation or a reunion lasting less than 
12 month is not considered in our analyses.  
3.2. Analyses’ Sample 
The sample of the MAFE survey is made of individuals aged between 25 and 75 at the time of the survey, born 
in Senegal and of present or past Senegalese nationality. Varied sampling methods were used to select the 
individuals. In Senegal, a stratified probabilistic sample was drawn. In Europe, various sampling methods were 
used. The municipal register in Spain (“pardon”) offered a national sampling frame from which documented and 
undocumented migrants could be randomly sampled. Respondents in France and Italy were sampled through 
varied non-probabilistic methods (e.g. snowballing, intercept points, contacts obtained from migrant 
associations) in order to fill pre-established quotas by sex and age (Beauchemin and Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011; 
Schoumaker, Mezger et al. 2013).  
Even though the MAFE survey offers a unique opportunity to study family reunification, the survey was not 
specifically designed for this purpose. For this reason, the analyses carried out in this article rely on a sub-sample 
of only 459 individuals (instead of 1,067) that are or were involved in a transnational couple
10
. How were these 
individuals and transnational couples selected? The first criterion of selection was that the individuals (male or 
female interviewees) had to be engaged in a transnational couple for a period of at least one year, being married 
                                                          
10 Note that 64 individuals were engaged in several couples, either successively or simultaneously (due to the 
practice of polygamy). As a result, the number of transnational couples under study (546) is higher than the 




, at some point in time (i.e. at the time of the survey and/or in the past). The second criterion was that the 
couple had to be made of a woman living in Senegal and a man living in France, Spain or Italy during the period 
of separation
12
 (see Table 1, especially cells with bold characters). This last restriction unfortunately prevents us 
from analyzing emerging couple arrangements in which the female is the pioneer partner (42 cases, see Table 1) 
and the male the one left behind in Senegal (25 cases). But numbers are too small to allow for specific analyses 
and priority was given to the constitution of a homogeneous sample, in order to facilitate interpretation of results. 
For the same reason, cases that involve varied destination countries out of France, Italy and Spain were also 
eliminated from the analysis sample (Table 1). Finally, we use a sample of 546 transnational couples (restricted 
to their first spell of separation)
13
, for which the data were obtained either from males interviewed in Europe 
(347 cases) or females surveyed in Senegal (199 cases).  
To take into account the changing characteristics of the couples (and of the partners themselves), the data was 
arranged as a couple-year dataset in which each couple appears when it becomes transnational for the first time 
(i.e. when the male migrates out of Senegal, leaving behind his wife, or when the partners start their relationship 
while living in separate countries) and disappears when it stops to be transnational, either because the couple 
reunifies (in Europe or Senegal) or because it breaks off (separation, divorce, widowhood), or –by default 
(censoring)– at the time of the survey (see Table 2 for a detailed account of these outcomes). Each year of life of 
a transnational couple is thus a line in the dataset and is considered as an observation in the analyses. The 
analytical sample is thus extended from 546 couples to 3,742 couple-years. 
Thanks to the longitudinal nature of the MAFE data, the variables describing the partners in the dataset can 
change every year. However, a major constraint of our analysis sample is that it contains asymmetrical 
information on the partners: the dataset contains a wealth of variables describing the interviewee at any point in 
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 Among all years of partnership registered in the survey, 89% correspond to periods of marriage vs. 11% to 
periods of consensual union. Note that homosexual couples are not considered in our analyses: no interviewee 
declared this kind of partnership in the MAFE survey. 
12
 This should not be confused with the place of interview, that can be Senegal or Europe for both men and 
women. 
13 395 interviewees experienced one spell of separation (period of transnational couple). 42 individuals had two 
spells of separation, 21 had three spells, and only one had four spells. Note that we analyze only the first spell of 
transnational life of every couple, having in mind that only 5 % of our analytical sample of individuals 
experienced several periods of transnational life with the same partner. This is why we have more spells of 
separation than individuals. 
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time (his/her whole history in matter of family formation, education and occupation, migration experience, etc.), 
but much less information describing his/her partner (only six variables: age, country of birth, nationality, couple 
status, education level and socio-economic status; and only at the time when the couple started). Additional 
variables are available to describe the couple itself: whether it started as a transnational partnership (i.e. the 
partners started their relationship while living in different countries, which is the case for 50% of the total 
sample, see Table 3); whether the couple is part of a polygamous family at any moment (i.e. whether the male 
has several partners or whether the female has co-wives); and the number of children at each point in time. 
3.3. Methods 
Using the longitudinal nature of the MAFE data, we computed discrete-time survival functions of the time 
between the start of the couples’ transnational life until their reunification Couples still living separated at the 
time of answering the survey, divorcing or becoming widow were treated as censored when the first of these 
events takes place. “Pseudo-survival” functions14 (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002) were computed to account for 
two possible outcomes (Figure 1): couple reunification takes place in Senegal (when the male partner returns to 
Senegal) or couple reunification takes place in Europe (when the female partner migrates to join her husband in 
Europe).  
Second, we performed multivariate discrete-time event history analyses to study the determinants of couple 
reunification. Since our objective is to analyze the factors explaining couples’ reunification either in Europe or in 
Senegal, we applied multinomial logistic regressions in a competing risk analysis that distinguish between both 
destinations, including a set of explanatory variables describing both the individuals and the couples in which 
they are engaged. Models are specified as follows (Yamaguchi 1991):  
log[Priy / (Psiy)] = αr + β’ Xriy  
where Priy is the conditional probability that transnational couple i experiences a first reunification either in 
Europe or in Senegal (the place being denoted by the subscript r) versus remaining separated (denoted by the 
subscrit s) at year y, given that reunification has not already occurred. α is a constant term, and Xriy a vector of 
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 Pseudo-survival functions refer to a process that can have two possible outcomes, modeled as competing risks 
outcomes. In this case, the graph depicts couple’s separation “survival”, until the separation ended either by a 
reunification in Senegal or by a reunification in Europe.  
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individual, couple and contextual covariates (including the baseline hazard function), with β denoting the value 
of the estimated coefficients of the model for each variable
15
.  
Following the same technical specifications, two multinomial models were run to test the effects of various 
characteristics of the couples and of each of their members. As we mentioned above, several variables were only 
available (or relevant) for one member of the couple. Accordingly, in Model 1 we investigate whether the fact 
that a woman lives with in-laws has any effect on the odds of reunification, while in Model 2 we control for 
several variables pertaining to men (whether he holds a work or residence permit, whether he reports to have a 
bad financial situations, and whether his father decided or paid for his migration trip). Table 3 presents some 
descriptive information on the explanatory variables included in the analyses and specifies whether they are 
time-varying or time-constant and for whom they are available (the interviewee and/or his/her partner). For 
instance the variable “ethnic group” refers to the respondent’s first answer on his/her ethnic group. Based on 
ethnographic information (Dupire 1977), we classified the main ethnic groups according to the degree of 
patrilineality. “Weak Patrilineal” groups include the Serer, Diola, Pular, and Peul; “Stong patrilinial” groups 
include the Wolof, Mandingue, Soninké, and Banbara. All results presented are weighted to account for the 
different sampling probabilities in each of the countries in which the survey took place. Details on the sampling 
strategy can be found in Beauchemin (2011).  
 
4. Results 
As Figure 1 clearly illustrates, couples’ reunification appears as relatively uncommon among Senegalese 
migrants, regardless of whether we consider reunification taking place at destination, i.e. in Europe, or in the 
country of origin, i.e. Senegal. Approximately 60 percent of migrants had not reunified with their partners after 
10 years since their separation started. The probability of reunification seems to be somewhat higher in the 3 
initial years of separation, to decline afterwards, according to our multivariate models; nevertheless in most 
                                                          
15 Since 64 individuals were engaged in more than one transnational couples because of polygamy or second or 
higher order unions, we also estimated multi-level models to account for potential correlation of multiple 
outcomes for the same individuals (Barber et al. 2000). However, these models did not provide substantively 
different results from those presented below. These multilevel models are available on request. 
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models the probability do not vary significantly with the duration  of the separation (see Table 4)
16
. Although for 
a small group of migrant couples reunification occurs relatively quickly, most couples seem to endure rather long 
separations. This result is not only consistent with theoretical perspectives that emphasize family dispersion as a 
functional strategy in order to diversify the household’s sources of income and risk (see above), but also with the 
anthropological literature that highlights the importance of complex family structures in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
especially in the Senegalese culture.  Furthermore, this pattern of long separations as an apparently stable family 
arrangement contrasts with the behavior of other migrant groups in countries like Germany or Spain that joined 
their partners at destination much faster (González-Ferrer 2007, 2010).  
Figure 1 reveals a second important finding: couple’s reunification in Senegal is almost as likely as reunification 
in Spain, Italy or France (these “pseudo survival functions” for each destination are not significantly different). 
This result challenges the extended belief that family reunification is very intense and only possible at 
destination, and highlights the importance of return migration. We will see below, however, that the 
determinants of reunification differ across places. Overall, these results suggest that couples’ reunification is an 
important component of the migration dynamics between Senegal and Europe, rather than only of migration from 
Senegal to Europe. It is therefore crucial to understand the choices of couple’s members, including whether and 
where they reunify. 
Long duration of separation may be conditional on the role of visits that partners make to each other. These visits 
seem to be quite frequent, as they involve 20 percent of the sample’s person-years. In fact, it is the partner living 
in Europe who is almost always the visitor: 27% of the males in Europe visited their partner at home at least 
once the first year of separation, while only 2% of the females left behind in Senegal visited their partner in 
Europe (Table 3). Obviously, visits are facilitated by holding a work or residence permit in the relevant 
European country, which is the case of two thirds of the men living in France, Italy or Spain in our sample. Even 
though frequent visits might indicate a stronger wish to be together, our results indicate that having visited the 
partner during the previous year substantially reduces the odds of reunification. Reunification in Senegal seems 
to be particularly negatively related to visits, since the odds are significantly reduced to 0.07, according to Model 
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 Similarly, the probability do not vary significantly with the duration of residence in France/Italy/Spain, nor 
with the duration of union (not shown in the specifications presented). 
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1 (Table 4). These results are consistent with transnational arrangements as a stable one, in which the visits, 
together with remittances, “(…) help to oil the functioning of the splitted families” (Grillo and Mazzucato 2008). 
Another striking finding is that as many as half of the couples started their union while living in different 
countries (duration of union at start of separation of 0 years; see Table 3). This is related to the fact that most of 
our sample involves young adult years, in which migration as well as partnership formation takes place. 
Furthermore, many Senegalese migrants living abroad seek for their partners in Senegal, not in their country of 
residence. Marriage migration may be connected to the strong gender imbalance among Senegalese migrant 
population living in Europe, and the fact that few women migrate independently (Vause and Toma 2012). It also 
suggests that having migrated facilitates union formation with someone living in Senegal, as already mentioned 
in qualitative studies (Mondain 2009). Our multivariate results show that the fact that the union started at a 
distance has no significant impact on the chances to reunify compared to those couples that had previously lived 
together.  
In all the models that were computed, the educational level provided strong and statistically significant 
coefficients. Thus, the odds of reunification strongly increase with the women educational level (Models 1 and 2, 
Table 4): women with a secondary level of education or higher show an odds ratio between 2 and 4 - depending 
on the place of reunification- times higher than women with primary level or less. The results for men in Model 
2 show somewhat weaker effects of education, with odds ratio for men with tertiary education of 1.5. and 1.7, for 
reunification in Senegal and Europe, respectively, compared to less educated ones. This result is highly 
consistent with our general hypothesis that individuals more economically or culturally integrated to European 
society will show higher probabilities to reunify, in particular in a European country. Education is an indicator of 
availability of personal resources as well as a sign of potential cultural assimilation to the Western culture and 
European languages. In fact, individuals with no or little formal education (some of whom may be illiterate) are 
very likely to have difficulties to successfully integrate into European labour markets, and have little chances to 
get a standard employment, many of them being actually working in the underground economy (Reyneri 2006). 
The jobs available to them may be not only very restricted to just a few occupations (such as agricultural 
labourers or street vendors), but also very precarious, thus not allowing them to successfully integrate in the 
labour market and have access to a residence and work permit. For women, formal education may imply more 
gender equality in the couple, and perhaps more importantly, greater chances of finding an employment that may 
help to bear the cost of living in Europe. According to MAFE survey data, in 2008 nearly two thirds of 
interviewed Senegalese partnered women living in Italy, Spain, or France held a job; about one fourth declared 
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to be housewives as their main occupation; and 4 percent declared to be unemployed. By contrast, 95 percent of 
partnered men living in these countries declared to be employed and 5 percent unemployed. 
The results concerning the educational level are consistent and complementary to those of the variable “socio-
economic status”. In particular for men, the higher is the occupational status, the higher are the probabilities of 
reunification. This result holds both for reunification in Senegal and in Europe. Men holding jobs in skilled 
occupations and in professional/employers occupations show reunification odds 1.5 times higher than men in 
unskilled occupations or self-employed without employees (Model 1, Table 4 ). This variable indicates a higher 
ability to afford the costs of the partners’ migration and expenses while in Europe, as well as better economic 
prospects and economic integration. It is interesting to see that men living in France, Italy or Spain that are 
unemployed or inactive show an odds of reunifying 3.3 times higher than men in unskilled jobs; however, these 
higher odds are entirely due to the much higher probabilities of returning to Senegal and reunify there with their 
partner (Model 1). The lack of resources for men living in Europe leads to shorten their stay in Europe, and 
indirectly foster reunification in Senegal. The importance of the economic resources is confirmed by the results 
of the variable “bad financial situation”17 that yields strongly negative and significant results for reunification in 
Senegal (odds of 0.1 with respect to individuals with good financial situation; Model 2), while also negative but 
insignificant results for reunification in France, Italy and Spain. Taken together, these results clearly demonstrate 
that men’s availability of economic resources is crucial for couple’s reunification, both in Senegal and 
particularly in Europe. The results of the socio-economic status variable for women provide unsignificant 
coefficients for reunification in Senegal, but in contrast, holding a skilled or professional occupation doubles the 
odds of reunification in Europe. Women with a good employment position in Senegal should have important 
opportunity costs of leaving their jobs, although it probably signals a higher chance of obtaining a job in Europe, 
thus reducing the costs of being in Europe. (Model 2). These results can be related, in the one hand, to the 
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average, would you say that the financial situation of the household regarding the purchase of basic goods was… 
1. More than sufficient, 2. Sufficient, 3. Just sufficient, 4. Insufficient”. Individuals that responded “Insufficient” 





generally subordinate economic position of women in the couples; and in the other hand, they emphasize the 
importance of the economic and social integration in Europe for reunification. 
Although having a residence or work permit does not guarantee qualifying as an applicant for legal family 
reunification of your immediate relatives in the home country, it is obviously a first step towards it. Accordingly, 
it is not surprising that the results of the variable “permit” show that it increases seven times the chances of 
reunification in Europe, while it has no significant effect on reunification in Senegal. Consistently with the 
cultural and legal restrictions existing in European societies to polygamous couples, the odds of reunification of 
this type of family arrangement are especially low in Europe (odds ratio: 0.6), while it has no significant effect 
for reunification in Senegal. This result suggests that this type of family arrangement tends to facilitate long 
periods of couple separation, since it may be negatively related to the emotional and social closeness of partners. 
Similarly, the presence of children, usually left behind in Senegal with their mother, greatly speeds reunification 
in Senegal (odds of 2.9), but reduces the odd of reunification in Europe (0.7). In both instances, the presence of a 
large family in Europe would be at odds with traditional family arrangements and would increase the costs of 
stay, in contradiction with a “target earner” type of migration. Women living with in-laws in Senegal have a 
much lower probability of reunification (odds of 0.03 for reunification in Europe, with respect to women who do 
not live with in-laws), which again provides evidence that an arrangement that fits the traditional organization of 
family roles and that is at odds with a conjugal type of family delays family reunification
18
. Living with in-laws 
is a feature of extended families characterized by patrilocality, that implies a strong hierarchy in which elders 
and men hold the power, and where the roles of women are bounded to the domestic sphere. According to 
qualitative studies, this involves in particular the care of the in-laws, restricting migration and more generally 
freedom to pursue individual goals by women (Vázquez-Silva 2010). We included a variable on the ethnic 
group, that shows that, where patrilineal practices are less strong, e.g. among the Serer and Diola, the probability 
of reunification in Europe increases significantly (odds ratio: 1.35) with respect to the clearly patrilineal groups, 
such as the Wolof. Additionally, the variable “men whose father decided or paid migration” could also indicate a 
strong vertical hierarchy in the family and subordination to the extended family interests. Consistently with this 
interpretation, this variable does have a negative effect on reunification, albeit with no significant coefficients. 
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 Note that it is also possible that a long lasting couple’s separation leads to changes in living arrangements for 
the partner left behind (we thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment).  
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Finally, we included the variable “religion” that shows that members of the Murid brotherhood have lower 
probabilities of reunification than other Muslims, irrespective of place of reunification. Christians show odds of 
reunification in Europe about twice higher than “other Muslims” (Model 2)
19
. Overall, these results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that individuals displaying behavior more distant to European culture will favor 
transnational living apart-together arrangements. 
5. Conclusions 
The MAFE data offered us a unique opportunity to bring new evidence on the process of family reunification 
among African migrants in Europe. Thanks to its transnational nature, this dataset allowed us to overcome the 
usual “methodological nationalism” often criticized in the recent literature of migrants’ families. Furthermore, its 
longitudinal nature allowed us to study the determinants of couple reunification in a life course approach.  
As expected, couples’ reunification appears as relatively uncommon among Senegalese migrants, regardless of 
whether we consider reunification taking place at destination or in the country of origin. Ten years after 
separation (due to migration), approximately 70 percent of migrants had not (re)unified with their spouses. 
Although for a small group of migrants couple’s reunification occurs relatively quickly, most couples seem to 
endure rather long separations. This result is not only consistent with theoretical perspectives that emphasize 
family dispersion in order to diversify the sources of income and risk, but also with the anthropological literature 
that highlights the importance of complex family structures in Sub-Saharan Africa, and especially in the 
Senegalese culture. Our results also reveal a second important finding: couple’s reunification in Senegal is 
almost as likely as reunification in Spain, Italy or France. This result challenges the extended belief that family 
reunification is very intense and only possible at destination, and highlights the importance of return migration. 
In addition, the models’ results generally support the hypothesis of increasing likelihood of reunification in 
destination countries with increasing economic and cultural integration and/or potential adaptability of both 
partners in Europe. For instance, men with secondary or tertiary education, i.e. those with a closer affinity to the 
western culture, have more chances to reunify in Europe than in Senegal. On the contrary, the less educated 
women (which may mean illiterate and with a lesser command of European languages) are more likely to reunify 
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 None of the Christians in our sample reunified in Senegal. 
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in Senegal, with the return of their partner, than in Europe through their own migration. In line with our 
integration hypothesis is the result that individuals holding a residence or work permit are also more likely to 
reunify in Europe. The variables indicating the “traditional” character of the couple (in contrast to a conjugal 
family type) also are consistent with our hypothesis. On one hand, the odds of reunification of polygamous 
couples are much lower in Europe than in Senegal, which is consistent with the cultural and legal restrictions on 
this type of family arrangement in European societies. And on the other hand, couples who are enmeshed in 
strong “traditional” networks at origin (e.g. with the left behind woman living with her in-laws) have a much 
lower probability of reunifying at destination.  
In short, in contradiction with common wisdoms, family reunification is generally more likely to occur in Europe 
among people easy to integrate in the host society. To what extent is this due to state polices or to a self-selection 
of migrants and their families into reunification? Even though our data do not provide any clues about the 
selection process in government administrations, our results tend to suggest that both levels are at play. State 
selection criteria typically include living conditions (earnings, housing) and legal requirements (being legal, 
being married, not being polygamous). Our models include these variables (or some proxies) and show that they 
play an expected role. Interestingly, other variables that are also related to integration prospects in Europe have 
also significant results (education, “traditional” family). Their effects, being net of the state-selection related 
variables, suggest that migrants and their families also tend to select themselves according to their integration 
potential. Their knowledge of the European economic situation and social context (adversity against Sub-
Saharan migrants) seems to impact negatively their probability to reunify in Europe. Family reunification 
appears indeed as a double selection act. Further research is however needed to better identify the impact of 
policy orientations on migration behaviors. More research is also needed to identify how decisions are taken 
within families and to understand the bargaining process that lead to the choice of reunification here or there or 
the choice to keep a transnational way of life.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Number of transnational couples in the MAFE-Senegal survey 
according to the sex and country of residence of the interviewee (non-weighted) 
Sex of the 
interviewee 
Country of residence of the interviewee  
when the period of separation started (whatever the place of the survey) 
Europe  
(France, Spain, Italy) 
Senegal Other country 
Male 347 25 85 
Female 42 199 77 
Notes: 
- Bold numbers signal the couples kept in our analysis sample (347+199=546). Other figures indicate the types and 
numbers of cases excluded from our analyses for the sake of homogeneity. 
- A same individual can appear in several transnational couples, hence a total number of 546 transnational couples 
for only 459 interviewees in our analysis sample. When several periods of transnational life occurred within a same 
couple, only the first spell of transnational was taken into account in the analyses (this is the case for only 5% of the 
analysis sample). 
- Couples may be married or not. In fact, in the analysis sample, only 11% of the couple-years are in consensual 
union. 
 
Table 2. Outputs of the 1
st
 period of separation of transnational couples (analysis sample, weighted data) 
 Total Sample Males’ in Europe Females’ in Senegal 
End of partnership 
(widowhood, divorce) 
12.8 12.4 13.2 
Reunification in Europe 19.4 12.7 33.2 
Reunify in Senegal 14.9 11.8 21.5 
Still transnational at the 
time of the survey 
52.9 63.1 32.1 
Weighted % 100% 100% 100% 
N (non weighted) 546 347 199 
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Table 3. Description of the sample of transnational life of each couple (weighted data) 
 Availabilty of the variable* Total Sample Males in Europe Females in Senegal 
 Interviewee Partner Proportion S.E. Proportion S.E. Proportion S.E. 
Socio-demographics variables 
Age (mean) TV TV 29.59 0.42 31.32 0.63 25.19 0.67 
Sex (proportion of men) TC TC 0.72 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Religion TC        
Christian   0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 
Murid   0.38 0.08 0.43 0.10 0.23 0.05 
Other Muslim   0.55 0.05 0.50 0.08 0.68 0.08 
Missing or other religion   0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Matrilinear TC  0.26 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.36 0.07 
Patrilinear   0.69 0.08 0.73 0.11 0.60 0.07 





only at the 
beginning of 
partnership 
      
No schooling 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.20 0.04 
Primary  0.47 0.05 0.45 0.06 0.54 0.07 
Secondary  0.33 0.05 0.37 0.06 0.24 0.08 




only at the 
beginning of 
partnership 
      
Unskilled occupations 0.34 0.05 0.40 0.06 0.21 0.06 
Self-employed (w/o 
employees) 
0.25 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.13 0.04 
Skilled workers 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.08 
Non manual jobs 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Not employed 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.54 0.07 
Migration experience / Left behind experience 








- - 0.12 0.03 - - 
Residence/work permit (yes) TV NA - - 0.62 0.06 -  
Bad financial situation TV  - - 0.43 0.05 - - 






NA - - - - 0.10 0.03 
Couple variables  
Duration of union: >5 years 
TV 
0.22 0.03 0.20 0.03 0.26 0.07 
Duration of union: 1-5 years 0.28 0.04 0.31 0.05 0.20 0.06 
Duration of union: 0 years 0.50 0.04 0.48 0.04 0.54 0.09 
Polygamous or co-spouse 
(yes) 
TV (only partially for women: 
for each union, women are 
asked whether they had/have 
co-wives) 
0.24 0.04 0.30 0.05 0.11 0.03 
Children (yes) TV 0.54 0.05 0.59 0.04 0.43 0.08 




546 - 347 - 199 - 
Persons years (unweighted) - - 3742 - 2535 - 1207 - 
* Indicates whether the information is available for the interviewee and his/her partner or not available (NA) and also whether the 
information is time varying (TV) or time-constant (TC). For time-varying variables, note that the figures in this table refer to the 
beginning of the period of transnational life of the couples. 
Note: Results are computed at the beginning of couple separation.  
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Reunification in Senegal 
      
Constant 0,00 *** 1,70 0,08 *** 1,92 
Years separated>3 0,71  1,36 0,59 * 1,32 
Union started separated 1,14  1,38    
Children 2,86 ** 1,60    
Visited partner 0,07 *** 2,08    
Polygamous 1,08  1,38    
Educational level (ref. Primary or less) Women   Men   
Secondary or higher 2,16 ** 1,36 1,46  1,34 
Economic status (ref. Unskilled occupations) Men   Women   
Skilled occupations 1,68  1,39 1,12  1,73 
Not employed 3,32 *** 1,54 0,66  1,51 
Ethnic group (ref. patrilinear)       
Matrilinear 0,99  1,42    
Other ethnic group 1,55  1,68    
Respondent is a man  1,43  1,39    
Woman living with in-law 0,28  3,10    
Religion (ref. Other Muslim)       
Christian       
Mouride    0,56 * 1,35 
Respondent is a woman    0,34 ** 1,62 
Man with residence or work permit    0,61  1,55 
Man with bad financial situation    0,10 *** 2,32 
Man whose father decided or paid migration    0,40  1,79 
 
Reunification in France, Italy or Spain 
      
Constant 0,10 *** 1,31 0,00 *** 3,00 
Years separated>3 1,13  1,20 0,83  1,17 
Union started separated 1,05  1,20    
Children 0,66 ** 1,22    
Visited partner 1,26  1,35    
Polygamous 0,58 * 1,38    
Educational level (ref. Primary or less) Women   Men   
Secondary or higher 3,03 *** 1,19 1,68 *** 1,17 
Economic status (ref. Unskilled occupations) Men   Women  1,00 
Skilled occupations 1,55 ** 1,19 2,03 *** 1,28 
Not employed 1,26  1,35 1,07  1,22 
Ethnic group (ref. patrilinear) 1,00  1,00    
matrilinear 1,35 * 1,19    
Other ethnic group 1,32  1,42    
Respondent is a man 0,12 *** 1,27    
Woman living with in-law 0,03 *** 2,75    
Religion (ref. Other Muslim)       
Christian    2,29 ** 1,51 
Mouride    0,73 * 1,21 
Respondent is a woman    28,79 *** 2,94 
Man with residence or work permit    6,89 * 2,89 
Man with bad financial situation     0,65  1,45 
Man whose father decided or paid migration    0,28  2,39 
ln-L -791,45   -827,41   
       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%. 
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